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Globalization and Firms’ Financing Choices:
Evidence from Emerging Economies
Abstract
This paper studies the relation between firm’s financing choices and financial
globalization. Using an East Asian and Latin American firm-level panel for the 1980s and
1990s, we study how leverage ratios, debt maturity structure, and sources of financing
change when economies are liberalized and when firms access international capital
markets. We find that debt-equity ratios do not increase after financial liberalization. Debt
maturity shortens for the average firm when countries undertake financial liberalization.
However, domestic firms that actually participate in international capital markets extend
their debt maturity. Financial liberalization has less effects on firms from countries with
more developed domestic financial systems. Leverage ratios increase during crises.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
1
Globalization and Firms’ Financing Choices:
Evidence from Emerging Economies
The 1990s witnessed increasing financial integration of emerging countries with
world capital markets. Emerging markets lifted restrictions on cross-country capital
movements, subsequently receiving large capital inflows. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
and portfolio flows became the main components of capital flows to emerging markets,
primarily through purchases of bonds and equity. As a consequence, companies from
emerging economies became active participants in international financial markets. As
emerging markets relied more on foreign financing, crises erupted in Mexico (1994),
Thailand (1997), and Russia (1998), with strong spillover effects across countries.
The events of the last decade and the prospects for increasing integration have
generated discussions on the pros and cons of “financial globalization.”
1 On the one hand,
free capital mobility allows consumption smoothing and risk sharing across countries,
creating new investment and financing opportunities. Also, more integration leads to the
development of the financial system, increasing transparency and market discipline and
improving the market infrastructure. On the other hand, faced with new financing
opportunities, domestic borrowers might take new risk. Also, open economies can
become dependent on foreign capital and vulnerable to capital flow reversals or potential
disturbances in international markets, what can trigger financial crises.
The existing literature already studies several aspects of financial globalization.
The finance literature tends to concentrate on the potential benefits of globalization. For
                                                          
1 By financial globalization we mean the integration of domestic financial systems with international
financial markets.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
2
example, it analyzes the effects of stock market liberalization on asset prices and
investment, using aggregate data. Standard international asset pricing models predict that
stock market liberalization reduces the cost of equity capital because, among other things,
it allows risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors.
2 Bekaert and Harvey
(2000), Henry (2000a and 2000b), and Kim and Singal (2000), among others, find
evidence consistent with the prediction that stock market liberalization increases equity
prices and investment. The evidence also suggests that there is no increase in volatility of
stock returns.
Another strand of the finance literature examines firm-level data to study a
different aspect of globalization, the cross listing of domestic stocks on major world stock
exchanges. These papers concentrate on abnormal returns, volatility, cost of capital, and
liquidity. See, for example, Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1988), Chan, Fong, and
Stulz (1995), Foerster and Karolyi (1996), Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998),
Hargis and Ramanlal (1998), Errunza and Miller (1999), and Miller (1999). Overall, the
papers find evidence of abnormal positive returns and lower cost of capital after cross
listing. Moreover, cross listing is associated with higher liquidity and lower volatility.
The international finance literature also analyzes the effects of globalization.
Though the literature discusses the benefits and costs of globalization (like Obstfeld
1998), a large body of work concentrates on one of the potential costs of globalization,
namely on financial crises. Part of this literature focuses on the link between financial
liberalization and crises; the argument is that globalization leads to more risk taking and
                                                          
2 See, for example, Stapleton and Subrahmanyan (1977), Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987),
Errunza (1999), and Stultz (1999).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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higher vulnerabilities. For example, McKinnon and Pill (1997) argue that financial
liberalization can lead to overborrowing syndromes, increasing the likelihood of crises.
Implicit government guarantees might prompt banks to engage in moral hazard lending
and drive economies to over-investment cycles. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that
financial liberalization might lead to lending booms, which precede banking and currency
crises.
Although the existing literature already provides evidence on some of the effects
of globalization, important aspects of this process are still unexplored. The goal of this
paper is to shed light on a different dimension of globalization. We examine firm-level
data to study the relation between the globalization of financial markets and firms’
financing choices (also known as financial structure). We focus on balance sheet data to
analyze: (i) the choice between equity and debt financing, (ii) the maturity structure of
debt financing, and (iii) the choice between internal and external financing. To do so, we
concentrate on the behavior of four key ratios: debt over equity, long-term debt over
equity, short-term debt over total debt, and retained earnings over total liabilities. As
explained in the next section, firms’ financial choices have already been analyzed in the
literature, but not in the context of globalization.
Our focus on balance sheet data is useful to understand new aspects of the
globalization process. First, we are able to study the relation between macroeconomic
factors (like financial liberalization, domestic financial development, and crises) and
firms’ financing choices. This relation is important because, among other things, the
liberalization of the domestic financial sector might create new financing opportunitiesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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for a closed economy. On the other hand, firms might take new risk when financial
systems are deregulated, possibly leading to the deterioration of balance sheets. As
Krugman (1999) argues, deteriorated balance sheets can play a crucial role during crises
and in their aftermath. Our data on balance sheets can provide direct evidence on how
firms’ financial structure is affected by different macroeconomic factors.
Second, balance sheet data enable us to study inter-firm differences within the
same macro framework. Our micro data allow us to examine how firms’ access to
international debt and equity markets is associated with financial structure. This is
important because not all firms tend to have access to international capital markets, even
when the financial sector is liberalized. If markets are segmented (if globalization opens
new financing opportunities only to some firms), there will be differences in the financial
structure of firms with and without access to international markets.
To study the effects of globalization on financing choices, this paper uses a novel
data set. We construct a large panel of non-financial companies located in East Asia and
Latin America. We work with seven emerging market countries that experienced sharp
financial liberalization processes and crises. Since we have long time series, we are able
to include periods characterized by crises, stability, financial restrictions, and financial
liberalization. Our data comprise firms from Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand. The data cover the 1980s and 1990s. We gather
information on balance sheets, firms’ characteristics, participation of companies in
international bond and equity markets, and country affiliation of firms.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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We measure globalization with macro and micro variables. The macro variable
captures when a country opens up its financial system to the rest of the world. To
construct the macro variable we use dates of stock market liberalization, which have been
widely used in the existing literature. Alternative measures, which use more
comprehensive indicators of liberalization, show that the years of stock market
liberalization coincide with the years of a more general liberalization of both the domestic
financial sector and the capital account of the balance of payments. To construct the
micro variables we use the dates in which firms issue bonds and equity in foreign capital
markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections I and II discuss the
methodology and data. Section III presents the basic results. Section IV shows the results
using alternative specifications. Section V concludes.
I. Methodology
There now exists a series of empirical papers that study the financing choices of
firms. This literature concentrates on the choice between debt and equity and on the
maturity structure of debt. The focus of the literature is to test hypotheses developed in
the theoretical literature on corporate finance, like the pecking order hypothesis (Myers
1984 and Myers and Majluf 1984). The domestic finance literature (e.g., Titman and
Wessels 1993 and Opler and Titman 1996) studies the evidence available for the U.S.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyze the case of industrial countries. Booth, Aivazian,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) study the case of 10 developing countries during
the 1980s.
3
To study financing choices in the context of financial globalization, we follow the
methodology applied by the current literature. But we use a new database that covers a
longer time span and contains more variables than existing databases. We include data for
the 1990s and variables that measure the integration of countries and firms with
international financial markets.
The four dependent variables we study are the following. The debt-equity variable
tracks the evolution of total debt and is defined as the ratio between total liabilities and
the book value of equity. Long-term debt over equity is the ratio between long-term
liabilities and the book value of equity. The third variable, short-term debt over total debt,
captures the behavior of firms’ debt maturity structure. The fourth variable, retained
earnings over total debt, describes the importance of internal financing.
4
The explanatory variables can be grouped into four different categories: (i) firms’
characteristics, (ii) macroeconomic factors, (iii) access to international capital markets,
and (iv) country effects.
The variables in the first category focus on key characteristics of firms.
5 The first
variable in this category is the logarithm of firms’ net fixed assets, which is a proxy for
the size of firms. The second variable, the ratio of firms’ net fixed assets over total assets,
                                                          
3 There also exist some case studies analyzing Ecuador, India, and Chile; see Jaramillo and Schiantarelli
(1996), Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1996), and Gallego and Loayza (2000).
4 The ideal variable to measure retained earnings would be retained earnings/total investment. However, the
lack of firms’ detailed flow statements does not allow us to use this variable.
5 These variables have been identified by the literature on corporate finance as important determinants of
agency costs that influence firms’ financing choices (see, for example, Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Maksimovic 2001).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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is an indicator of asset tangibility. The third variable, firms’ profits after taxes over total
assets, captures the capacity of firms to generate internal resources. Finally, we also
include a new variable, which reflects the production mix. This is a time-invariant
dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is a producer of tradable goods, and
zero otherwise. Tradable producers have the capacity to generate revenues in foreign
currency; thus, they might be able to obtain different financing opportunities, as discussed
in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1998).
6
The second category involves macroeconomic variables that affect firms’
financing. The first variable, financial liberalization, captures the effect of stock market
liberalization on financial structures. The second variable is related to financial crises. We
use dummy variables for the years 1995, 1997, 1998, corresponding to the Mexican crisis
(1995) and Asian crisis (1997 and 1998).
7 The last macroeconomic variable is the degree
of domestic financial development interacted with the financial liberalization dummy.
This interaction captures whether financial liberalization affects financially
underdeveloped economies more than financially developed countries.
The variables in the third category measure the effects of expanding the financing
opportunities through access to international bond and equity markets. The variable
capturing access to international bond markets is a dummy variable that takes the value
one for the periods in which a given firm issues bonds in international capital markets,
and zero otherwise. Thus, this variable captures not only the ability to access international
markets but also the actual participation of firms in those markets. The variable capturing
                                                          
6 The capacity to generate revenues in foreign currency is viewed as one of the most important factors to
obtain international collateral and, therefore, gain access to external financing.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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access to international equity markets is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value
one from the moment that a firm starts trading or starts raising capital in international
equity markets, and zero otherwise.
8
As a last category, we include country dummies to control for the nationality of
firms. This is important in light of previous work on corporate finance. Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1996) find that country characteristics, such as the efficiency of legal
institutions and the development of capital markets in different countries, are important in
explaining differences in firms’ capital structure.
We estimate panel regressions for every dependent variable. The basic regression
uses data for the seven emerging economies in the sample; it is a pooled panel that allows
for heteroskedasticity of the residuals. Additionally, we estimate three alternative
specifications to check for the robustness of the results.
9 The first alternative specification
estimates separate panels for the East Asian and Latin American economies to determine
if there are regional differences. The equations estimated for the pooled panels are:
c,t i t c c,t i t i,c c i c t c i M A X ' p n Y , , , , , , , ' ' ' ' ω θ γ β π η + + + + + = ,( 1 )
,...,T t C c ,...,N i 1    and   , ,..., 1   , 1  that  such = = = .
                                                                                                                                                                            
7 The year 1998 also captures the Russian crisis, which many regard as part of the Asian crisis.
8 We define this variable differently than the variable capturing access to international bond markets
because some firms trade their equity in international markets without raising new capital. This can take
place through issuance of depositary receipts in international markets using equity outstanding in domestic
markets. As an alternative approach to measure access to international equity markets, we also used the
ratio of value traded in depositary receipts to the value traded in domestic markets. The results do not
change significantly when using this alternative variable.
9 In fact, we also estimate a logistic transformation of the variable short-term debt over total debt as another
alternative, because the variable is bounded between 0 and 1. The results are very similar. Therefore, we
report the results without the transformation to make our results comparable with the existing literature.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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Yi,c,t represents the four dependent variables defined above, which measure firms’
financing choices. The sub-indexes i,  c, and t stand for firm, country, and time
respectively.  Xi,c,t  stands for the three variables capturing firms’ characteristics. Ai,c,t
denotes access to international financial markets. Mc,t captures the macroeconomic
variables, which only vary with time and countries but not across firms. nc stands for the
country fixed effect. pi,c stands for the production mix.
As a second alternatively, we report within (or fixed effects) estimates. These
estimates do not include country specific effects and the production mix variable because
they are perfectly collinear with firm dummies. The within models estimated are:
c,t i t c c,t i c,t i c i t c i M A X f Y , , , , , , ,   ' ' ' ' ε θ γ β φ + + + + = ,( 2 )
such that fi,c is the firm-specific effect. We assume that the error terms, ω i,c,t and ε i,c,t, can
be characterized by independently distributed random variables with mean zero and
variance 
2
, , t c i σ .
The above estimations assume exogeneity of the explanatory variables. This is
consistent with the existing literature on corporate finance. However, if some of the right
hand side variables were endogenously determined, we would need to use instruments.
To control for potential endogeneity biases and to check the robustness of the results, we
estimate instrumental variable models of equation (1), as the third alternative
specification.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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II. Data
Our sample contains firm-level data from seven emerging economies: Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand. To compare the pre-
liberalization period with the post-liberalization period, it is necessary to use more than
one database. Data on firms’ balance sheets come from two sources with some
overlapping years, the corporate finance database of the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and Worldscope. IFC has complete data for the 1980s and early 1990s;
Worldscope has a large data set for the 1990s.
The complete data set comprises annual balance sheet data of publicly traded
firms, from 1980 to 1999. The pooled data set contains about 700 firms. This is the
number of firms that remain in the sample after removing financial firms, outliers, firms
that data set for less than three years, and firms with incompatible time series (due to the
use of two sources). For each country, the data set contains the following number of firms
and time periods: Argentina, 70, 1988 to 1999; Brazil, 102, 1985 to 1998; Indonesia, 72,
1989 to 1998; Malaysia, 111, 1983 to 1998; Mexico, 48, 1981 to 1998; South Korea, 94,
1980 to 1998; and Thailand, 189, 1980 to 1999.
The data set includes detailed information on the financial structure of firms, but
it does not include sources and uses-of-funds statements. We exclude from the sample
financial firms and banks, because they do not report information on the maturity
structure of their debt and we are particularly interested in studying maturity.
To measure financial integration at the firm level, we construct indicators of
access to international bond and equity markets. We use data from the Bank of NewWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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York, Euromoney, and JP Morgan (1999), which have a complete list of international
bond issues, equity issues, equity cross listing, and depositary receipt programs.
To measure financial liberalization, we use a dummy variable, following the stock
market liberalization dates reported in Bekaert and Harvey (2000). The liberalization
years for each country are Argentina 1991, Brazil 1990, Mexico 1993, Indonesia 1992,
Malaysia 1992, South Korea 1993, and Thailand 1990. Similar liberalization dates are
used in other papers, like in Henry (2000a and 2000b). We believe that the variable we
use captures more general financial liberalization processes. As mentioned in the
introduction, stock market liberalization takes place jointly with other financial
liberalization measures. In fact, we obtained similar results using alternative variables,
which account for more general measures of financial liberalization.
To measure the degree of domestic financial development, we use the sum of the
stock market capitalization and liabilities of the banking sector, as a percentage of GDP,
following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000). We compute the interaction of this
variable with the financial liberalization dummy. The data come from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators.
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the data for East Asia and Latin America
using different time periods. The mean debt equity ratio for the entire sample is 1.896.
Short-term debt represents on average 70 percent of total debt; the mean retained earning
over total liabilities is 0.311. When comparing the 1980s and the 1990s, the data show
some differences, although they do not appear to be very large. For example, the means of
both debt-equity and long-term debt-equity ratios decrease during the 1990s. WhenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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comparing East Asia and Latin America, there are more differences in the data. East
Asian firms are more levered than Latin American companies. The mean debt-equity and
long-term debt-equity ratios are 2.383 and 0.716 in East Asia, while they are 0.751 and
0.297 in Latin America.
10
III. Pooled estimates
This section presents the econometric results of the pooled estimates, which are
displayed in Table 2. We first describe the effects of firms’ characteristics on financial
structure, to compare our results with the existing literature. Second, we describe the
macroeconomic effects on financial structure. Third, we analyze how access to
international financial markets affects financing choices.
A. Firms’ characteristics
The results show that the variable size of firms, captured by the log of net fixed
assets, is statistically significant in the models for long-term debt and the maturity
structure of debt. Larger firms have a higher level of long-term debt and a lower
proportion of short-term debt. This suggests that large firms have better access to credit
markets than small firms do.
The variable related to the tangibility of assets, net fixed assets over total assets, is
statistically significant. Large tangible assets are associated with lower debt-equity ratios,
but not with long-term debt. At the same time, large tangible assets are related to a longer
debt maturity structure. This effect seems to takes place through a reduction in short-term
debt, since the tangibility of assets is not statistically significant in the equation for long-
                                                          
10 Note that data on retained earnings for Mexican firms are not available.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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term debt. The finding on tangibility of assets supports the argument by Morris (1976)
according to which firms match the maturity of assets and liabilities. To reduce the
probability of liquidity problems, firms with larger fixed assets need a longer maturity
structure.
The variable profits over total assets is statistically significant. More profits are
associated with lower debt-equity ratios. Also, higher profits are related to a shorter debt
maturity structure, suggesting that long-term debt shrinks more than short-term debt.
Additionally, higher profits are positively related to the level of internal financing
(retained earnings over total debt). The results are consistent with the pecking order
hypothesis. Higher profits shifts the financing choices towards internal financing, such
that retained earnings finance investment projects, avoiding the market undervaluation of
firms’ securities. The above results are comparable and consistent with the existing
literature; see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001).
The estimations suggest that tradable producers have lower long-term debt. The
maturity structure of tradable producers is tilted towards the short-term, relative to non-
tradable producers. These are new results; they have not been tested before in the
literature. Given that tradable producers can create international collateral, they are less
vulnerable to domestic financial crises. Then, following Diamond (1991), tradable
producers are expected to be less concerned about liquidity risk and might prefer a shorter
maturity structure.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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B. Financial liberalization and crises
The results show that financial liberalization is statistically significant in the
estimations of financing choices. First, the ratio of long-term debt to equity is lower after
financial liberalization. Second, as economies become more liberalized, the maturity
structure shifts to the short term.
Financial liberalization does not seem to lead to higher debt-equity ratios. Debt
might increase after financial liberalization, but the evidence does not support an increase
of debt relative to equity.
11 Perhaps both debt and equity are increasing as more financing
opportunities come about. By focusing on debt relative to equity, the insignificant
coefficient does not seem consistent with the claim that financial opening leads to
overborrowing.
The development and growing importance of equity financing during the 1990s
can help explain why we find a declining long-term debt-equity ratio and an insignificant
coefficient for debt over equity. Financial liberalization in the 1990s differs from
liberalization programs of the previous decade. Portfolio flows and FDI now play a
crucial role in international capital markets. Moreover, globalization could have reduced
the cost of equity capital, which in turn could have helped with the development of equity
markets. Stulz (1999), among others, explains how globalization reduces the cost of
equity capital. He argues that globalization can reduce the discount rate that investors
apply to cash flows generated by equity investment. Stulz also explains that globalization
                                                          
11 As a caveat, consider that these estimates only cover non-financial firms and that financial liberalization
took place in the early 1990s. Debt-equity ratios could have increased during the mid 1990s and mostly in
financial firms.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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could improve corporate governance, making it less expensive for firms to raise funds in
capital markets.
The existing literature on corporate finance provides arguments that can explain a
shortening debt maturity structure after financial liberalization. Myers (1977) shows that
shareholders might decide to underinvest to avoid passing the proceeds of future projects
to bondholders, when the value of firms depends on growth opportunities. Myers claims
that, alternatively, a shorter debt maturity structure can avoid sub-optimal investment
decisions. Firms from emerging economies typically face new growth opportunities when
financial liberalization takes place. In fact, large current account deficits in emerging
economies are usually interpreted as evidence of new investment in projects with high-
expected returns. To take advantage of these opportunities, firms might decide to
undertake short-term borrowing.
Existing arguments in the international finance literature also support the
shortening in maturity after financial liberalization. As economies open, low international
interest rates and expectations of government bailouts in the case of crises can make it
optimal for domestic borrowers to seek international financing. On the other hand,
asymmetric information between foreign lenders and domestic borrowers and inadequate
prudential regulation and taxes can provide incentives for lenders to limit their financing
to the short term. This situation might lead to increasing short-term debt when economies
open.
12 Another argument can be made for economies characterized by a long process of
                                                          
12 For a discussion, see for example Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), and Jeanne
(2000).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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growth without productivity gains.
13 Factor intensive growth increases the likelihood of
facing diminishing returns in the long run. Anticipating this, newly available international
financing due to financial liberalization will mainly take the form of short-term debt,
shifting the debt maturity structure.
14
Financial crises have a significant effect on leverage ratios. Debt-equity ratios
increased during the Asian crisis. But leverage ratios did not increase during the Mexican
crisis, which was confined to the first quarter of 1995 and involved mainly Mexico and
Argentina. The increase in leverage is not driven by the decline in stock market prices,
because we work with the book value of equity. High interest rates during crises likely
explain the increase in leverage ratios. Debt contracts with floating rates might have
increased the level of long-term debt.
C. Financial liberalization and domestic financial development
In the previous section, we studied the effect of financial liberalization on
financing choices. However, countries with varying degrees of domestic financial
development might be affected differently by financial liberalization. Firms from
countries with developed domestic financial systems are expected to see relatively few
changes after gaining access to world capital markets. Whereas, companies from
countries with underdeveloped domestic financial markets likely face more changes in
their financing opportunities as financial sectors are liberalized.
                                                          
13 This is the case of some East Asian economies in the last two decades; see Krugman (1994).
14 Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1998) argue that low profitability in some of the East Asian economies
forced firms to look for external financing during the decade previous to the financial crisis, with short-term
debt playing an important role.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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We test whether domestic financial development matters, using the interaction of
the variables domestic financial development and financial liberalization. This interaction
measures the effect of financial liberalization on firms’ financing choices, according to
the degree of domestic financial development.
The results show that countries with more developed domestic financial systems
are less sensitive to liberalization. The interaction variable, as expected, has the opposite
sign to the liberalization variable. In other words, the negative relation between
liberalization and long-term debt is stronger in countries with less developed domestic
financial systems. Similarly, the maturity structure moves to the short term to a lesser
degree in countries with deeper financial markets.
D. Access to international markets
The financial liberalization variable captures the impact of financial integration
for the average firm. But this variable does not identify the effect of the actual
participation in international financial markets. To study this effect, we investigate how
firms’ financial structures change when they issue bonds or trade equity in international
markets. Firms with access to international capital markets might have different financing
choices than firms that fund investment through domestic markets.
The results show that access to international equity markets is associated with
better access to long-term debt and, consequently, with a longer debt maturity structure.
This result implies that participation in international equity markets through cross listing
or depositary receipts could simplify firms’ access to debt markets. Access to equity
markets might differentiate firms, acting as a signal of credit worthiness.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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Similarly, access to international bond markets is positive and statistically
significant in the case of three variables. Access to international bond markets is
positively associated with debt over equity and long-term debt over equity. More
importantly, access to bond markets extends the maturity structure of debt. Capital
markets in developed countries typically have better financial institutions and are more
liquid than markets in emerging economies. These characteristics tend to promote deep
markets for long-term financing. The evidence suggests that firms from emerging
economies benefit from accessing international markets, where they obtain long-term
financing.
In sum, the financial liberalization variable and the variable capturing access to
international capital markets suggest that financial integration does not seem to have a
uniform effect across firms. On the one hand, access to international capital markets
during the 1990s is associated with an extended maturity structure for firms that
participate in these markets. On the other hand, the maturity structure shrinks for the
average firm. These two findings suggest that firms constrained to local financial markets
are the ones relying more on short-term debt.
IV. Alternative estimates
In this section, we report alternative estimates to show the sensitivity of the results
presented above. First, we obtain separate estimates for East Asia and Latin America.
Second, we calculate within estimates. Finally, we use instrumental variables.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
19
A. Regional estimates
Four points are worth mentioning when comparing pooled results with regional
estimates. These points focus on the differences between East Asian and Latin American
estimates, which are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. First, firm specific characteristics seem
to be more relevant in East Asia than in Latin America. Some variables that turn out
statistically significant in East Asia are not significant in Latin America. For example,
larger firms obtain more long-term debt and rely less on retained earnings only in East
Asia. Also, tradable producers have less long-term debt and a shorter debt maturity
structure, while tradable producers rely more on internal financing in East Asia.
Second, the financial liberalization process seems to have more significant effects
in Latin America. Only in this region, the financial liberalization variable is statistically
significant in the equations that explain total debt and long-term debt. This variable takes
a negative sign, meaning that leverage decreases after financial liberalization. Changes in
debt-equity ratios can be reflecting not only changes in debt but also changes in equity. In
fact, Latin America received record levels of equity investment in the 1990s, what might
be explaining the results.
Third, access to international bond markets is associated with an increased debt-
equity ratio in Latin America, but not in East Asia. Fourth, the Asian crisis had significant
effects both in East Asia and Latin America. As expected, the point estimates suggest that
the Asian crisis had a much stronger impact in East Asia, despite its spillover effects to
Latin America.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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B. Within estimates
The within estimates allow us to analyze whether the results obtained in the
pooled estimates are mainly driven by the cross-sectional variation. Table 5 shows that
the results hold within firms for most of the variables. With respect to the variables
related to access, when firms access the international bond and equity markets, they
increase their long-term debt and extend the maturity of their debt. The previous results
related to financial liberalization, financial development, and crises also hold for the
within estimators in most cases. Thus, the results from the previous sections are not only
driven by differences between firms with and without access to international capital
markets.
One result is new in the within estimates. The maturity structure shifts to the long
run both during the Mexican and Asian crises. This result might be the combination of
two effects. Firms with outstanding long-term debt face higher floating-rates during
crises, increasing the level of long-term debt, as the estimates show. At the same time,
firms might find it difficult to roll over their short-term debt contracts during crises.
C. Instrumental variables
Endogenous explanatory variables could bias the above results. In the event of
endogeneity, it would likely be caused by the explanatory variables with cross-firm
variation; macro variables are more likely to be exogenous. In particular, the variable
capturing access to international bond markets might be endogenous, since it could be
easier for firms with a certain financial structure to issue bonds internationally.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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To study the sensitivity of the results to potential endogeneity biases, we use the
following instruments. In the case of the variables with continuous values and the
variable access to equity markets, we use lagged values of the same variables as
instruments. We work with two lags, to avoid cases for which there might be first-order
autocorrelation of the residuals. This technique assumes that past values of the
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error term. At the same
time, past values of the explanatory variables should be correlated with contemporaneous
values of the explanatory variables.
In the case of the variable access to bond markets, past values of the dummy
variables are not suitable instruments because of their low correlation with
contemporaneous values. Therefore, we construct an instrument that indicates whether
capital markets are “open” for the country in which the firm resides. The instrument takes
the value one if two conditions are fulfilled. First, markets are “open” for the country, in
the sense that at least one firm from that country issues bonds in international capital
markets during that period. Second, the firm is an “international” firm, in the sense that
the firm was able to issue international bonds at least once in the sample period.
Otherwise, the variable takes the value zero. This variable seems to be a valid instrument,
given that the degree of market openness tends to be uncorrelated with the firm-level
error term and, at the same time, it is correlated with the firm’s access to international
bond markets.
The instrumental variable estimates, displayed in Table 6, suggest that the
previous results seem to be robust to endogeneity biases. The firm characteristics that areWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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statistically significant in the pooled estimates mostly remain significant and with the
same sign when we use instrumental variables. Something similar occurs for the variables
related to financial liberalization. Access to international bond markets is positively
related to a higher long-term debt-equity ratio and to a longer debt maturity structure.
Access to international equity markets is related to higher leverage and long-term debt
and to a longer debt maturity structure.
V. Conclusions
The process of financial globalization has attracted much attention. Some argue
that globalization is beneficial, providing new investment and financing opportunities.
Others claim that globalization can lead to overborrowing, higher vulnerabilities,
exposure to volatile international markets, and eventually crises. Even though the debate
is intense, only partial aspects of globalization have been analyzed.
This paper studied a new and important aspect of the globalization process by
focusing on balance sheets. The paper shed new light on the behavior of firms’ financing
choices when countries integrate financially with world markets. The paper focused on
non-financial firms from East Asia and Latin America. These regions have been
integrating rapidly with the world economy and were hit by recent crises. Using a firm-
level panel, the paper studied the behavior of leverage ratios, debt maturity, and the
choice between external and internal financing when economies become financially
liberalized and when firms access international capital markets. To our knowledge, thisWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
23
type of evidence has not been previously examined and complements well the evidence
found using aggregate data.
The paper showed that the globalization of financial markets has significant
effects on firms’ financing choices. The conclusions and new results from this paper can
be summarized as follows.
First, debt relative to equity does not tend to increase after financial liberalization.
In fact, debt-equity ratios tend to decrease in Latin America, perhaps due to the rapid
development of equity markets in the 1990s. The evidence does not support the view that
liberalization drives the economy to overborrowing if one concentrates on debt relative to
equity.
Second, the results suggest that financial liberalization is associated with a shorter
debt maturity structure. This effect is important in light of the arguments raised in recent
work, suggesting that short-term debt maturity can play a crucial role in financial crises.
What remains to be explained is why short-term debt increases after liberalization.
Perhaps, foreign investors with inferior information are willing to lend only short term,
once they gain access to previously closed markets. Given that financial liberalization is
associated with shorter debt maturity, the evidence supports the claim that liberalization
policies should be accompanied by strengthened prudential regulation to prevent maturity
mismatches.
Third, the evidence indicates that firms from emerging economies with more
developed domestic financial systems are less affected by financial liberalization. This
implies that developed domestic financial sectors might provide similar financialWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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instruments to the ones obtained abroad, what is particularly important for firms with no
access to foreign financing. Moreover, if there exist any negative effects of financial
liberalization, countries with more developed domestic markets should be less concerned
about opening up their financial systems. If financial liberalization yields positive effects,
countries with less developed financial sectors will be the ones benefiting the most.
Fourth, the data suggest that firms with access to international financial markets
expand their financing opportunities. Firms with access to international bond markets
increase their long-term debt, extending their debt maturity structure. Firms with access
to international equity markets also increase their long-term debt and extend their debt
maturity structure, as if access to international equity markets were a signal to access
international debt markets.
Overall, the results show that firms with access to international capital markets
extend their debt maturity, while the average firm reduces its maturity structure with
financial liberalization. This suggests that globalization probably has uneven effects;
firms that do not participate in international markets are likely increasing their short-term
financing liabilities. In future work, it would be interesting to study in detail how firms
confined to domestic financial markets are affected when a group of domestic firms go
global.
Finally, leverage ratios tend to increase and the maturity structure extends during
crisis times. Higher interest rates are likely behind the increase in debt-equity ratios.
Higher floating rates on long-term debt and non-renewal of short-term debt contracts
probably explain the change in maturity structure, given that issues of international andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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domestic bonds decreased during the crisis years. This is important because higher future
debt payments tend to slow down the recovery after crises.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 388
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Mean
Stantard deviation
Number of observations
Mean
Stantard deviation
Number of observations
Mean
Stantard deviation
Number of observations
Mean
Stantard deviation
Number of observations
Mean
Stantard deviation
Number of observations 1,832 1,832 1,832 1,353
1.236 0.962 0.235 17.816
0.751 0.297 0.673 0.848
East Asia, 1980s and 1990s
4,301 4,301 4,301 4,443
2.383
9.408
0.716
1.433
0.716
3,991 3,991 3,991 3,741
9.605 1.329 0.191 10.724
1990s
1.789 0.540 0.706 0.388
1980s and 1990s
0.311
6,133
7.943
1.896
6,133
1.324 8.618
5,796
0.591
0.373
2,142 2,142 2,142 2,055
0.703
0.216
2.949 1.309 0.209
1980s
2.095 0.686 0.699 0.170
6,133
Table 1
Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for the following ratios: debt/equity, long-term debt/equity, short-term debt/total debt
ratio, and retained earnings/total liabilities. The first two ratios represent the firms' leverage, the third ratio captures the
maturity structure of the debt, while the fourth ratio is a measure of internal financing. The first three panels contain summary
statistics of the pooled data (East Asia and Latin America) for different sample periods.
          Dependent Variables
Debt / Equity
Long-term debt       
/ Equity
Short-term debt        
/ Total debt 
Retained earnings / 
Total liabilities
Latin America, 1980s and 1990s
0.147
0.206 0.419Explanatory Variables
Firms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets -0.064
(-0.755)
0.073
(4.034)
*** -0.036
(-14.331)
*** -0.090
(-1.135)
Net Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.865
(-3.196)
*** -0.093
(-1.192)
-0.160
(-9.522)
*** -0.578
(-1.681)
*
Profits/Total Assets -8.682
(-3.647)
*** -1.827
(-7.677)
*** 0.192
(5.240)
*** 5.947
(3.580)
***
Tradable Producers -0.085
(-0.350)
-0.238
(-3.770)
*** 0.066
(6.759)
*** 0.119
(0.834)
Access to International Capital 
Markets:
Access to Int'l Equity Markets 0.303
(1.423)
0.225
(3.035)
*** -0.121
(-9.098)
*** -0.485
(-1.025)
Access to Int'l Bond Markets 0.286
(1.971)
** 0.267
(3.508)
*** -0.106
(-6.029)
*** -0.351
(-1.049)
Financial Liberalization and 
Crises:
Financial Liberalization -0.007
(-0.015)
-0.214
(-2.490)
** 0.068
(6.335)
*** 0.285
(0.933)
Financial Development Interacted 
with Financial Liberalization
0.082
(1.515)
0.054
(2.264)
** -0.021
(-4.391)
*** -0.156
(-0.959)
Mexican Crisis - 1995 -0.198
(-0.696)
-0.019
(-0.594)
-0.006
(-0.564)
1.560
(1.080)
Asian Crisis - 1997 2.286
(1.892)
* 0.613
(3.289)
*** 0.001
(0.058)
0.002
(0.117)
Asian Crisis  - 1998 1.208
(2.605)
*** 0.423
(2.459)
** -0.022
(-1.284)
0.028
(0.145)
Country Effects:
Argentina -1.687
(-4.583)
*** -0.223
(-3.148)
*** -0.104
(-7.110)
*** 3.533
(1.596)
Brazil -1.376
(-2.831)
*** -0.055
(-0.968)
-0.148
(-11.234)
*** 0.101
(0.602)
Indonesia -0.011
(-0.035)
-0.046
(-0.693)
-0.027
(-1.760)
* 0.083
(0.505)
South Korea 1.273
(1.542)
0.577
(4.243)
*** -0.046
(-3.662)
*** 0.667
(1.676)
*
Malaysia -1.099
(-2.132)
** -0.010
(-0.170)
-0.091
(-7.837)
*** 0.034
(0.391)
Mexico -0.318
(-0.529)
-0.218
(-1.623)
0.027
(1.538)
Constant 2.962
(7.798)
*** 0.233
(1.741)
* 1.070
(53.167)
*** 0.433
(1.056)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.034 0.141 0.241 0.010
Number of Firms 686 686 686 667
Number of Observations 6133 6133 6133 5796
The table reports pooled panel results for the following ratios: debt/equity, long-term debt/equity, short-term debt/total debt
ratio, and retained earnings/total liabilities. The first two ratios represent the firms' leverage, the third ratio captures the
maturity structure of the debt, while the fourth ratio is a measure of internal financing. Standard errors are robust, using the
White correction for heteroskedasticity. Thailand is the base country. T-statistics are in parenthesis.  
Retained earnings / 
Total liabilities
          Dependent Variables
Table 2
Pooled Estimates
 *,**,*** indicate 10,5,1 percent level of significance respectively.
Long-term debt       
/ Equity
Short-term debt        
/ Total debt 
Debt / EquityExplanatory Variables
Firms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets -0.068
(0.631)
0.130
(5.1386)
*** -0.043
(-11.697)
*** -0.031
(-5.189)
***
Net Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.990
(-2.971)
*** -0.194
(-2.069)
** -0.132
(-7.488)
*** -0.047
(-1.503)
Profits/Total Assets -13.853
(-2.914)
*** -2.241
(-4.926)
*** 0.203
(3.817)
*** 2.470
(12.951)
***
Tradable Producers 0.040
(0.124)
-0.275
(-3.928)
*** 0.073
(7.110)
*** 0.026
(2.848)
***
Access to International Capital 
Markets:
Access to Int'l Equity Markets 0.284
(0.769)
0.289
(2.608)
*** -0.108
(-6.188)
*** 0.118
(1.261)
Access to Int'l Bond Markets 0.112
(0.473)
0.294
(2.501)
** -0.083
(-3.513)
*** -0.015
(-0.705)
Financial Liberalization and 
Crises:
Financial Liberalization 0.812
(0.788)
0.087
(0.578)
0.060
(4.323)
*** 0.016
(0.876)
Financial Development Interacted 
with Financial Liberalization
-0.174
(-0.525)
-0.062
(-1.442)
-0.017
(-2.900)
*** 0.007
(0.824)
Mexican Crisis - 1995 -0.222
(-0.488)
0.016
(0.336)
-0.005
(-0.408)
0.015
(0.637)
Asian Crisis - 1997 2.809
(1.717)
* 0.766
(3.106)
*** 0.007
(0.456)
0.012
(0.383)
Asian Crisis  - 1998 1.349
(1.959)
* 0.514
(1.961)
** -0.006
(-0.262)
0.026
(0.718)
Country Effects:
Indonesia -0.059
(-0.225)
-0.258
(-3.293)
*** -0.005
(-0.319)
0.357
(7.986)
***
South Korea 2.015
(1.697)
* 0.543
(3.208)
*** -0.029
(-1.980)
** 0.265
(11.613)
***
Malaysia -0.800
(-1.161)
0.350
(3.849)
*** -0.119
(-7.698)
*** -0.027
(-1.088)
Constant 3.006
(4.762)
*** -0.316
(-1.572)
1.106
(39.103)
0.159
(3.233)
***
Adjusted R-Squared 0.030 0.147 0.249 0.232
Number of Firms 466 466 466 503
Number of Observations 4301 4301 4301 4443
 *,**,*** indicate 10,5,1 percent level of significance respectively.
Table 3
Pooled Estimates - East Asia
The table reports pooled panel results for East Asian countries, for the following ratios: debt/equity, long-term
debt/equity, short-term debt/total debt ratio, and retained earnings/total liabilities. The first two ratios reprsent the firms'
leverage, the third ratio captures the maturity structure of the debt, while the fourth ratio is a measure of internal
financing. Standard errors are robust, using the White correction for heteroskedasticity. Thailand is the base country. T-
statistics are in parenthesis.  
          Dependent Variables
Debt / Equity
Long-term debt       
/ Equity
Short-term debt        
/ Total debt 
Retained earnings / 
Total liabilitiesExplanatory Variables
Firms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets 0.039
(1.229)
0.040
(1.560)
-0.029
(-7.341)
*** -0.309
(-1.066)
Net Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.701
(-3.172)
*** 0.014
(0.111)
-0.215
(-4.197)
*** -1.927
(-1.366)
*
Profits/Total Assets -2.624
(-8.454)
*** -1.296
(-6.636)
*** 0.182
(3.391)
*** 10.219
(2.524)
**
Tradable Producers -0.114
(-1.069)
-0.004
(-0.082)
-0.009
(-0.278)
0.805
(0.652)
Access to International Capital 
Markets:
Access to Int'l Equity Markets 0.145
(1.550)
0.120
(1.722)
* -0.137
(-6.403)
*** -1.780
(-1.305)
Access to Int'l Bond Markets 0.195
(2.310)
** 0.145
(2.578)
*** -0.124
(-4.514)
*** -0.560
(-0.629)
Financial Liberalization and 
Crises:
Financial Liberalization -0.566
(-3.906)
*** -0.363
(-3.383)
*** 0.113
(4.358)
*** 2.259
(0.771)
Financial Development Interacted 
with Financial Liberalization
0.571
(1.437)
0.308
(1.048)
-0.136
(-2.584)
*** -4.378
(-0.682)
Mexican Crisis - 1995 0.061
(0.757)
0.013
(0.245)
-0.001
(-0.059)
6.664
(1.034)
Asian Crisis - 1997 0.290
(2.008)
** 0.164
(1.508)
-0.012
(-0.455)
-0.883
(-0.798)
Asian Crisis  - 1998 0.347
(1.908)
* 0.208
(1.952)
* -0.031
(-1.040)
0.261
(0.257)
Country Effects:
Argentina 0.010
(0.066)
0.020
(0.157)
-0.133
(-4.541)
*** 3.241
(1.597)
Brazil -0.083
(-0.451)
-0.076
(-0.531)
-0.137
(-4.245)
***
Constant 1.243
(3.253)
*** 0.165
(0.557)
1.128
(20.509)
1.483
(1.309)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.077 0.046 0.215 0.012
Number of Firms 220 220 220 164
Number of Observations 1832 1832 1832 1353
 *,**,*** indicate 10,5,1 percent level of significance respectively.
Table 4
Pooled Estimates - Latin America
The table reports pooled panel results for Latin American countries, the following ratios: debt/equity, long-term debt/equity,
short-term debt/total debt ratio, and retained earnings/total liabilities. The first two ratios reprsent the firms' leverage, the third
ratio captures the maturity structure of the debt, while the fourth ratio is a measure of internal financing. Standard errors are
robust, using the White correction for heteroskedasticity. Mexico is the base country. T-statistics are in parenthesis.  
          Dependent Variables
Debt / Equity
Long-term debt       / 
Equity
Short-term debt        
/ Total debt 
Retained earnings / 
Total liabilitiesExplanatory Variables
Firms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets -0.121
(-2.649)
** 0.003
(0.234)
-0.020
(-7.455)
*** -0.095
(-1.301)
Net Fixed Assets/Total Assets -0.060
(-0.194)
-0.048
(-0.465)
-0.077
(-3.559)
*** 0.166
(0.860)
Profits/Total Assets -8.220
(-2.910)
*** -1.559
(-5.888)
*** 0.198
(5.195)
*** 2.601
(1.798)
*
Access to International Capital 
Markets:
Access to Int'l Equity Markets 0.326
(0.792)
0.275
(2.138)
** -0.053
(-3.242)
*** -0.034
(-0.231)
Access to Int'l Bond Markets 0.136
(0.748)
0.259
(3.512)
*** -0.074
(-5.905)
*** 0.156
(1.168)
Financial Liberalization and 
Crises:
Financial Liberalization 0.108
(0.290)
-0.006
(-0.102)
* 0.030
(3.120)
*** 0.021
(0.197)
Financial Development Interacted 
with Financial Liberalization
0.085
(0.591)
0.021
(1.129)
*** -0.016
(-3.958)
*** -0.056
(-0.800)
Mexican Crisis - 1995 -0.057
(-0.392)
0.028
(0.999)
-0.018
(-2.235) 
** 1.377
(1.382)
Asian Crisis - 1997 2.301
(1.855)
** 0.684
(3.802)
*** -0.013
(-1.408)
0.187
(0.816)
Asian Crisis  - 1998 1.367
(3.580)
*** 0.459
(3.071)
*** -0.029
(-2.189)
** 0.317
(1.577)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.108 0.300 0.578 0.165
Chi-Hausman 0.005 0.855 41.885 *** 0.022
Number of Firms 686 686 686 667
Number of Observations 6133 6133 6133 5796
 *,**,*** indicate 10,5,1 percent level of significance respectively.
Table 5
Within Estimates
The table reports within (or fixed effects) results for the following ratios: debt/equity, long-term debt/equity, short-term
debt/total debt ratio, and retained earnings/total liabilities. The first two ratios reprsent the firms' leverage, the third ratio
captures the maturity structure of the debt, while the fourth ratio is a measure of internal financing. Standard errors are
robust, using the White correction for heteroskedasticity. Thailand is the base country. T-statistics are in parenthesis.  
          Dependent Variables
Debt / Equity
Long-term debt       
/ Equity
Short-term debt        
/ Total debt 
Retained earnings / 
Total liabilitiesExplanatory Variables
Firms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets -0.018                                       
(-0.306)
0.102                                      
(5.474)
*** -0.037                                       
(-9.381)
*** 0.028                                        
(0.482)
Net Fixed Assets/Total Assets -1.607                                       
(-5.971)
*** -0.267                                       
(-2.211)
** -0.182                                       
(-8.604)
*** -1.379                                        
(-1.435)
Profits/Total Assets -16.518                                       
(-5.054)
*** -3.663                                       
(-7.243)
*** 0.240                                       
(2.103)
** 13.466                                      
(1.430)
Tradable Producers 0.163                                       
(0.530)
-0.219                                       
(-3.123)
*** 0.068                                       
(5.937)
*** 0.006                                          
(0.060)
Access to International Capital 
Markets:
                                                                                                                       
Access to Int'l Equity Markets 0.841                                       
(2.566)
** 0.415                                      
(3.575)
*** -0.088                                       
(-4.144)
*** -0.576                                    
(-0.861)
Access to Int'l Bond Markets 0.648                                       
(1.575)
0.284                                       
(2.047)
** -0.226                                       
(-6.079)
*** -1.888                                       
(-1.359)
Financial Liberalization and 
Crises:
                                                                                                                       
Financial Liberalization -0.263                                                        
(-1.459)
-0.242                                       
(-3.216)
*** 0.056                                       
(4.090)
*** 0.196                                         
(0.602)
Financial Development Interacted 
with Financial Liberalization
0.092                                       
(1.097)
0.059                                       
(2.119)
** -0.015                                       
(-2.175)
** -0.173                                       
(-0.707)
Mexican Crisis - 1995 -0.402                                      
(-1.130)
-0.051                                       
(-1.491)
-0.007                                       
(-0.574)
1.514                                       
(1.010)
Asian Crisis - 1997 0.808                                       
(1.607)
0.386                                       
(4.006)
*** -0.006                                       
(-0.418)
-0.107                                      
(-0.395)
Asian Crisis  - 1998 0.644                                       
(1.417)
0.234                                       
(2.903)
*** -0.022                                       
(-1.222)
-0.200                                      
(-0.648)
Country Effects:                                                                                                                        
Argentina -2.008                                       
(-2.972)
*** -0.209                                       
(-2.479)
** -0.091                                       
(-4.541)
*** 5.351                                       
(1.676)
*
Brazil -1.849                                       
(-2.307)
** -0.045                                       
(-0.528)
-0.139                                       
(-7.893)
*** 0.773                                       
(1.473)
Indonesia -0.186                                      
(-0.258)
-0.063                                       
(-0.785)
-0.002                                       
(-0.133)
-0.669                                       
(-0.734)
South Korea 0.602                                       
(0.720)
0.379                                       
(3.914)
*** -0.044                                       
(-2.805)
*** 0.629                                       
(1.371)
Malaysia -1.217                                       
(-1.794)
* 0.112                                       
(1.501)
-0.101                                       
(-6.185)
0.452                                       
(0.988)
Mexico -1.237                                      
(-1.467)
-0.414                                     
(-2.974)
*** 0.066                                       
(2.850)
***                                        
Constant 3.825                                       
(5.691)
*** 0.130                                       
(0.844)
1.078                                       
(35.387)
*** -0.372                                      
(-0.661)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.031 0.178 0.240 0.011
Number of Firms 686 686 686 667
Number of Observations 4654 4654 4654 4482
 *,**,*** indicate 10,5,1 percent level of significance respectively.
Table 6
Instrumental Variable Estimates
The table reports instrumental variables results for the following ratios: debt/equity, long-term debt/equity, short-term
debt/total debt ratio, and retained earnings/total liabilities. The first two ratios reprsent the firms' leverage, the third
ratio captures the maturity structure of the debt, while the fourth ratio is a measure of internal financing. Standard
errors are robust, using the White correction for heteroskedasticity. Thailand is the base country. T-statistics are in
parenthesis. Instruments are lagged explanatory variables of Firms' Characteristics (except the variable Tradable
Producers), lagged values of the variable Access to Int'l Equity Markets, and an indicator of each country's access to
international bond markets. See main text for description of the latter instrument. 
          Dependent Variables
Debt / Equity Long-term debt       
/ Equity
Short-term debt        
/ Total debt 
Retained 
earnings / Total 
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